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beyond the confines of representationalism, and discusses Heidegger’s ‘matter’ of Ereignis as the ‘mis-
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‘poiesis’. This leads to a radical notion of (transcendental) empiricity beyond the ordinary sense of ‘the 
empirical’ and, in light of this, a questioning of cultural relativism and the invisibility of the ontological 
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research and the possible deconceptualisation of (the idea) culture. The final section summarises the 
paper by offering a (counter) definition of culture as such. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The image must cease to be second in relation to a 
supposedly prior object and must demand a certain 
primacy, just as the original and then the origin will lose its 
initial privileges.... There is no longer any original but an 
eternal twinkling in which the absence of any origin is 
dispersed in the flash of detour and return’ (Maurice 
Blanchot, ‘Le rire des dieux’ quoted in Deleuze, 1994). 
This paper relates to a larger project that has been 
engaged in over several years under the working title of 
‘Culture and Representation’.1 Somewhat obviously, that 
project turns on a question about what appears, on the 
face of it, to be two ‘concepts’, culture and representation 
and their inter-connections. Beginning with the sceptical 
question ‘why representation?’, it goes on to show that 
almost all hitherto existing theories of culture have started 
out from representationalist premises. That is, they treat 
cultures, cultural objects and events as remorselessly 
representation of something else; as re-presenting 
something more fundamentally present than themselves, 
something outside themselves, something more primary 
still: the ‘real’ phenomena that make culture, by contrast, 
always epiphenomenal.2 Naturally, ‘nature’ is always the 
main contender in these stakes, though ‘economy’, 
‘science’ and ‘society’ are not far behind. But after looking 
at Foucault’s (1970) narrower historical sense of an ‘age 
of representation’ and then at Heidegger’s (1975) much 
broader version of representation as a form of thinking 
that has continually deflected philosophy from its path 
towards Being and then ploughing this back into cultural 
theories from Hobbes to the present day, the project goes 
on to its second main question, the one that faces us 
here: the being of culture itself, beyond representation. 
Another stage along the way was a piece called 
‘Ordinary Heterodoxies’ (1997b). There, it was argued — 
against representationalist views of culture — that culture 
might be more akin to a kind of owning. But it was soon 
found that this ‘owning’ was far from pure and that it can 
operate via a kind of doubling: that whatever secures 
cultural ‘knowledge’ as something owned by a cohort 
(Sharrock, 1974) also secures its capacity to be used by 
another; to be begged, stolen, borrowed, and so on. At 
that point, the exact term for that ‘undecidable’ double 
was eluded. But, on later reflection, the ugly, but accurate 
term, ‘(ap) propriability’ was decided on. 
The word is close to, and derives from, the term that 
inhabits most of Heidegger’s later work on language and 
art. In German, it is Ereignis and different translators 
tellingly render it in almost opposite ways, sometimes as 
‘appropriation’ (Heidegger, 1971b), sometimes as 
‘propriation’ (Heidegger, 1993). To move away from repre-
sentational(ist) versions of culture, that is, we might begin to 
insist instead on the necessity of this (mis)ownability as the 
double that secures the cultural object as ‘coming to 
presence’, as ‘bethinging’, as never quite settling down to 
a finished and final ontic status. 
Our thesis will be: since what comes to count as a 
cultural object is, ontologically speaking, always flickering or 
hovering and never settling between two states (of finally 
being owned-propriated  and  of  finally  being  misowned-  
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appropriated), it is never quite an object as such but is, 
rather, a movement.  And this movement can be called its 
event-ness or eventality, since, as we shall see, Ereignis 
also marks the idea of an event. 
Ereignis, according to Heidegger, comes before spea-
king, writing, art, before even Being itself, as a way of 
thinking its ‘essential origin’. He writes: 
 
The matter [of Ereignis], while simple in itself, still 
remains difficult to think, because thinking must first 
overcome the habit of yielding to that view that we 
are thinking here of ‘Being’ as appropriation. But 
appropriation is different in nature, because it is 
richer than any conceivable definition of Being. 
Being, however, in respect of its essential origin, can 
be thought of in terms of appropriation (1971b). 
 
If Ereignis has this function, then it is obvious that it is far 
from a settled and easily definable matter in Heidegger’s 
thinking; yet it is also obvious that, in stumbling upon the 
idea of (mis)owning, this work was at least beginning to 
approach the being of culture outside representational 
thought. To appropriate is, as such, to seize, adopt, 
confiscate, allocate, secure, take away, expropriate, 
usurp. And, by the same token, ‘propriation’, is to retain 
something as one’s own: to guard it against seizure, 
adoption, confiscation, allocation, removal, expropriation 
and usurpation. Ereignis, then, is the double that means 
both of these apparently exclusive motions, towards and 
away. It has roughly the following etymology. 
Although Heidegger (1971b) warns us against taking it 
this simply, Ereignis is literally, in ordinary German: event, 
happening, occurrence, and incident. And this means not 
just an odd or peculiar incident but also an everyday 
occurrence. It is related in another way, however, to 
‘peculiar’ as in ‘particular’ or ‘idiosyncratic’, as we shall 
see shortly. It might also be thought of as referring to a 
singularity, an event which is utterly an event rather than, 
say, a mere instance of an ideal category of events. 
Ereignis, in this sense, and among its other senses, 
points us in the direction of event-ness or eventality. It is 
also connected with Auge, and so refers to ‘“that which 
becomes visible, real” (“Das Unzulängliche, Hier wird’s 
Ereignis”, Goethe, Faust II)’ (Farrell, 1977). 
The related verb is ereignen: to happen, to occur, to 
take place, to come about, to come to pass. Here, 
Ereignis is the coming about, perhaps even the coming to 
presence, of the object-event. It is the event-ness or 
eventality of the event: its ‘eventing’. And this marks an 
instability in terms of settled, completed and finished 
matters or affairs. In fact, it may mark as much a ‘calling’  
— from a possible, conditional, or future state of 
completedness — of the object-event.  
Heidegger’s translators move, naturally, following 
Heidegger’s own glosses on the term, in the direction of 
‘owning’ and ‘(ap)propriation’. How is this? Strictly, to 
appropriate is aneignen (which is also to acquire). The 
related nouns are Aneignen and Aneignung: adoption, 
(mis)appropriation, usurpation, seizure and even assimi-
lation (in the physiological sense). But  the  root  to  which  
 
 
 
 
both belong, allowing their functional similarity, is eigen, 
the adjective meaning ‘own’ as in ‘one’s own’ — a marker 
of what is not shared, a peculiarity or a characteristic 
feature (Eigenart); and here we re-intersect with the idea 
of the peculiarity or singularity of eventness. Hence: 
Eigenschaft, a particular quality or characteristic, and also 
the verb, eignen, to belong.3 
With so much room for manoeuvre, Heidegger’s usage 
is not straightforward. Rather it works and plays with 
Ereignis to get the effect of what is peculiar to a person, 
to a group or, indeed, to all people — their ‘ownness’ or 
‘authenticity’ perhaps — but all of these can only be ‘in the 
event’, in the coming (about) of the event, in its eventing, 
eventness or eventality. ‘Cultural’ specificity, then, is 
never quite settled, always open, hovering between its 
completion (as a fixed ‘cultural trait’, for example, or as a 
definition of culture) and the impossibility of that 
completion.  
And it is in this respect that we can see why something 
akin to ‘hybridity’ is never quite off the agenda, even in the 
most seemingly settled of cultural matters. When some-
thing’s nature is to be unsettled (even when a ‘settlement’ 
might be the first mark of a culture), it is nomadic, in flight. 
And we mistake that nature as soon as we think of 
culture, a culture, or a cultural object (a component of a 
culture) as something which has taken root. Even in 
settling, we are always settling in another’s place — as 
they, too, are settling in ours. Eventality points to this 
unsettlement of the event, even in its most apparently 
settled forms. 
And, at the same time, because this ‘process’ is not 
fixed, neither is the full sense of property, being proper, 
being utterly of one’s own and not shared. It comes, in 
and through the hovering event-to-come, also to contain 
and require contamination, appropriation, mis-
appropriation, seizure, adoption and assimilation. Ereignis 
is what (as a general quality) in any event, the singularity 
of any event, is its coming about, its coming to be visible 
as one’s own but which never reaches the final 
destination of complete property or propriety since it is 
always made ‘impure’ and improper along the way 
(essentially) with what is not one’s own, with what is appro-
priated. Or else: it is the appropriability’s coming to pass. 
If we were still in the business of looking for definitions, 
this would be about as good a definition of culture as we 
could wish for. And the name of the approach that puts this 
first, prior to any ‘subject’, representation or conceptua-
lisation, would be ‘empiricism’ in a radical sense, or, 
better still, ‘eventalism’.  
As we start away from representational thinking and to-
wards eventalistic experiencing, then, the critical feature, 
if such it is, of the cultural, is its fragility.  
So we could think of non-representational thinking as 
starting from the ontological fragility of the ontic. Here, the 
‘ontological’ would point to the domain of coming-to-
presence while the ‘ontic’ would point to the merely exis-
tent (the domain of simple empiricity); in fact, the latter 
would point to what is only apparently completed as an 
object (Hence one definition of the ontological difference 
is: the difference between the ontological and  the  ontic.).  
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At the same time, this ontological fragility of culture is its 
artifactuality, marking the essential becoming-ness or 
incompletion of an artifact (cultural object) but also 
offering this fragile ontological status as its being, its (f) 
actuality beyond the mere facts. 
This is another kind of thinking about culture, then, 
which does not begin from the sheer givenness of any 
cultural artifact. Rather, fragility-eventality (fragiventality?) 
suggests insubstantiality to all definite substances.4 In 
Specters of Marx, Derrida (1994) writes of this capacity of 
the unfixed, of the to-come, as its spectrality. The ghost of 
the undecidable haunts this other kind of thinking. But 
‘fragiventality’ is also coming-to-presence — which is not 
a coming-before (in the sense of a determinate narrative 
history of origins) — rather it is a counter-ontological 
claim against the sheer ontic presence of what is (or its 
absence). In Deleuze’s (1991) terms, it is an insistence on 
a transversal axis of historical contingency, of an irreversi-
ble arrow of accidental time with no further determination 
‘behind’ it and allowing no possibility of prediction or 
calculation (cf. Baugh, 1993). 
Although several terms will remain tendentious, we can 
begin to express this diagrammatically, beginning with the 
ontological difference and ending with two distinct 
propositions concerning the cultural domain and its being 
— for even the most overtly empirico-scientific versions of 
culture (such as ethnography or content analysis) must be 
predicated on a general description of its being. They cannot 
be outside metaphysics in this respect. Indeed, as the 
diagram shows, their grounding version of culture (as 
derivation from facts) is much more problematically 
metaphysical than the non-representationalist alternative to 
the left. 
 
 
       EITHER                                            OR 
    the ontological                                  the ontic 
 
     coming-to-presence                        presence 
                  |                                                /\ 
                  |                                              /    \ 
                  |                                            /        \ 
             poiesis                           Language ...  Art ... etc. 
                  |                                                | 
                  |                                                | 
             decision                                   decided 
             Ereignis                                    owned 
                  |                                                | 
                  |                                                | 
 The possibility of culture is         The ideality of culture is 
derived from the eventuality         derived from the facts 
      of the ‘to come’                                of what is 
 
 
 
 
If, according to the ontological description, culture is only 
possible as a derivation from what Derrida calls the ‘to-
come’, then it is still always already coming about. 
Heidegger’s and Derrida’s common mentor, Nietzsche, 
puts it this way: ‘a kind of becoming must itself create the 
illusion of being’ (1968). But this ‘illusion’ does not say 
that what is (the empirical, the actual) is a mere construc-
tion of ideality. Rather it says that  the  empirical-actual is, 
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itself, illusive when looked at in terms of its ontological 
status. It turns out that, it is a creation (of becoming or 
eventality). And that creation or making is poiesis (in a 
quite different sense from, for example, Vico’s notion of 
the ‘poetic’ which is civic and empirical human making).  
The seemingly solid givenness of the ontic is, ontolo-
gically speaking, its com-position — its position with or 
alongside another which is not ‘properly’ part of it. What 
comes about is composed. And so becoming in the onto-
logical sense is not, strictly, empirical (ontic) becoming 
(as was the ‘poetic’ for Vico). It is the coming-about of the 
ontic, yet it is separate and distinct from those empirical 
‘production’ processes that are the descriptive objects of, 
for example, ethnography when it asks: How are TV 
programs ‘read’ by their audiences? or How do people 
actually work in order to generate conversations? When 
the cultural disciplines turn to ‘processes of production’, 
they stop the radical ontological sense of poetic becoming 
in its tracks. They assume the presence of cultural 
objects (as ontic matter(s)) and then assume an equally 
ontic ‘process’ behind it, in the form of crudely empirical 
histories. This (history) is where cultural objects come 
from, on this story and sheer immediate presence is 
where they go to and stop in their completion. They then 
become merely instances of a cultural ideal pre-existing 
them, in their ‘histories’. 
To move away from this picture, empiricity has first to 
be freed from the representationalist distinction between 
the empirical event (datum or instance) and the ideal 
event (principle or law). One way is to think empiricity not 
as a property of the ontic but, instead, as eventality: 
coming-about, derivation from the ‘to come’, passing 
through the ‘ordeal’ of the decision (as Derrida puts it), 
poiesis, composition. This takes us to the groundless but 
grounding eventality of the ‘to come’ — which in the 
sphere of ‘culture’ (and no doubt, now, elsewhere) is 
Ereignis. What is to come, is to come through acts and 
deeds in their eventality, as ‘what happens’. 
Elsewhere ‘what happens’ has been taken as defini-tional 
of community (Nancy, 1993) or, perhaps, of ‘social order’. 
But now we must, along with Nancy, remind ourselves 
that, this is not a subject or a substance in the ontic 
sense. Rather, what comes about does so through and as 
‘community’, in the sense of a history of decisions made 
and decisions still to come. So a community — a ‘cohort’ 
in Sharrock’s (1974) terms — is not an empirical 
presence (a substance or a subject) but rather an event-
ness — a call or calling towards. And this call always 
comes from what it is possible for a ‘culture’ to be. 
Culture, then, can not be ‘empirical’ in the sense of a 
shared, given/fixed substance. Its empiricity is its event-
like-ness — its evented character. It is, in and through its 
dependence on passing through the ‘ordeal’ of the 
decision, given to undecidability. And this distinguishes 
radical eventalism from the empiricism of facts. Such an 
eventalism, then, partly rejoins (although it differs from) 
Hume-Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism — precisely 
because of its insistence on the essentiality of the unde-
cidable, the ‘to come’, the coming-about as the ground of 
presence itself (or indeed of absence) (Deleuze, 1991). 
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If eventuality is undecidable empiricity — the passage 
through the ‘ordeal’ of the undecidable, the condition of 
the decision, the poetic — then culture does not derive in 
any strict sense. What could it derive from? Rather it 
revolves; it constitutes a revolution. It revolves, or — less 
perfectly, perhaps — wobbles, unpredictably around the 
axis of (ap)propriation. It is in this important sense only 
that Ereignis is a revolutionary concept.5 
If we had, then, to reorient Deleuze’s position in line 
with the Heideggerian movement away from represen-
tationalism (and thereby, incidentally, bringing it closer to 
Derrida’s ethics of decision), we should have to say that 
the becoming-empirical (reaching to empirical presence) 
is the transcendental-empiricity of culture. And this is 
another way of speaking of its eventality. Any cultural 
instance (what we have previously called a ‘cultural 
object’) is a call-event which is never fully answered and 
so never fully settles into that which is present in the ontic 
sense (the empirically finished). It would not matter where 
we went to look, we would never find this condition, as it 
were, lurking ‘inside’ a work of art, a fragment of dance or 
a TV program. And yet, on the other hand, every time we 
look at such things, we cannot fail to be close to that 
condition. But our proximity cannot be rendered by 
analysis, only by hinting, by alluding, by an openness to 
the spectral. It is not a question of whether or not it is 
experience that brings knowledge (the traditional question 
of empiricism) — rather it is a question of how we 
experience and according to what differences. And this 
too is a decision. How it is made has to do with the ethics 
of what the author of this work used to call ‘analysis’ 
(1996). 
The empiricity (that is, eventality) of culture is, in this 
sense, of a different kind from that of the finished (the 
perfect) object which is the ‘proper’ object of the cultural 
disciplines (from anthropology to cultural and literary 
studies and including the ‘arts’). And in beginning to think 
this way, we move to a realisation very similar to 
Heidegger’s realisation about language. Where the 
‘sciences’ of language begin is with the ontically complete 
state of a language. If, instead, we turn to its Ereignis, 
Heidegger found, we begin to see how it is that language 
itself — that is, our (ap)propriation of language and its 
(ap)propriation of us — is the bearer of a message; we 
see how it, in its being, calls attention to becoming-ness 
or ‘bethinging’ (die Bedingnis) (Heidegger, 1971b). Then 
we see that it is this call of language itself which has 
brought about the change in our thinking. By the same 
token, if we move away from the representational thinking 
of the cultural ‘sciences’, we see that culture is whatever 
calls us perpetually to rethink our (and indeed anything’s) 
objectness as empirical becoming. We find that it is the 
spectral aspect of culture itself (outside representational 
thinking) that calls us to change our thinking. 
Hence, the ‘essence’ of culture cannot be found in the 
ideality that derives from the inspection of empirical 
objects, cultural facts. Rather its nature is not to have an 
‘essence’ as such, but rather what we might, perversely 
perhaps, call an ‘origin’ — or, in Derrida’s (1978: 203) 
terms, a ‘non-origin which is originary’ — in  the  space  or  
 
 
 
 
possibility of eventality. And this is related to, but still quite 
different from, Foucault’s (1981) insistence upon positivity 
as essential facticity, and thus upon the method of 
‘eventalisation’. If cultural objects have an ‘objectness’ 
(origin), it lies in the radical incompletion of their object-
ness, their empirico-evental becoming. The search for the 
defining characteristic of cultural objects ends up — once 
the word for ‘characteristic’ has become Ereignis — as an 
insistence on their incompletion. And this incompletion is 
not an imperfection — except perhaps in the grammatical 
sense of the imperfect — but rather an opening to 
eventness. 
Cultural hermeneutics could, henceforth, be the doing 
of this opening (of oneself) to eventness. Then her-
meneutics would not be ‘analysis’ in any strict sense. 
Rather it would be a kind of experiencing as opposed to 
traditional empiricism’s derivation from experience. What 
this hermeneutics would experience is the event as 
empirical; not in the sense of the empirical vs the ideal 
(which is a division within representational thinking) — but 
rather in the sense of stemming from eventality, from an 
openness to becoming whose finished form cannot be 
known in advance. 
By contrast with this indefinitely open picture, the 
cultural disciplines consist in the fixing of the other in (or 
as) definiteness — which denies any other yet to come. 
This is so a fortiori when those disciplines are ‘relativistic’ 
or ‘empathetic’ towards the other; for then they do not 
intend and cannot see the violence of their appropriation, 
believing themselves just and fair to the other, when in 
fact their justice and fairness are certainly their own but 
not necessarily the other’s. In this sense, it may be true to 
say that only Western cultural sciences are culturally 
relativistic — or at least that cases outside the West are 
either accidentally similar to it or else effects of 
assimilation. 
Cultural relativism, then, denies the singularity 
(Ereignis) of the other by its (unseeingly violent) 
imposition of its own rule (as law and right, as legislation). 
Any rule (as law and right or legislation) must be both in 
excess of and less than any possible singularity. Any case 
of an other which is not, in itself, culturally relativistic 
defeats or falsifies the rule and is done an injustice or 
violence by it; and yet the first rule of cultural relativism is 
also ‘do no violence to the other’. So while there may be, 
as we have noted, empirical cases of culturally relative 
non-Westerners, cultural relativism remains intrinsically 
Western by virtue of its demand for its own universality. It 
appears to be a kind of judgment which runs from the 
particular case to the general rule, but underlying this 
‘methodology’ is a still more general rule that stipulates 
the universality of ‘culture’ as presence.6 
What the cultural ‘sciences’ cannot see is the onto-
logical difference. Therefore they have no sense of what 
may come (to presence). And what comes (to presence) 
is called (forth) by the undecidable which is, in terms of its 
tense perhaps, the imperfect conditional (what might be in 
the process of coming about). Cultural relativism, then, 
cannot hear this call, since it ‘respects’ all cultures only as 
perfect (finished) instances effected or perfected  by  their  
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pasts (their histories, in the narrow sense). It runs out, for 
example, in cases where cultures turn against their 
previous ‘traditional’ characters — for example, where the 
synthetic (‘foreground’) Japan of microprocessors and 
artificial intelligence displaces the authentic 
(‘background’) Japan of kimonos and rice-paper walls 
(Heidegger, 1971). 
By contrast, we would have to hold that ‘coming to be’ is 
always in principle contestable. Hence my experience is 
of ‘what I own’ (eignen). And my experience of the other 
is of what ‘I have appropriated’ (ereignen, aneignen) from 
it. And the reverse also holds. Either way, this is a 
distinction between the author’s Dasein and theirs — a 
distinction unavailable to the cultural disciplines. And so 
no amount of ethnographic training will get us to the 
fundamental nature of the relation to the other: that it is 
only ever a possibility — and so cannot be stabilised as a 
rule or accessed by a method. The fact of it being only 
ever possible is essential (but not ‘an essence’). It is 
necessary (unequivocal — un-equivocal). The equivocal 
(for example, the ideal speech situation) is only ever still 
to come because what we now call ‘culture’ is only ever 
(ap)propriation: never a final ‘property’ or ‘properness’. 
Nor does it reside entirely in the domain of the other. 
Culture itself, therefore, is still to come (as the 
unknowable ‘hybrids’ of appropriability). It is itself an 
example of (just one case of) another and not the ‘key’ to 
the analysis, experience or understanding of all others. 
For it to be such a key, the cultural disciplines would have 
to (as they probably do) share Kant’s aim: to close the 
gap between the actual and the ideal. But no singularity is 
ever either. It is, itself, an instance of a possible closure 
— but never an ‘ideal’ one. And so the Kantian closure of 
the actual-ideal distinction is itself, then, an ideal; it is 
always distant — away — missing the singular. It remains 
in the hinter-land of the singular (hinter: ‘behind’ and also 
‘beyond’). 
The mistaken way of starting to look at culture is to say: 
‘culture is already here, now analyse it’. Then — for the 
cultural disciplines — culture is only ever dead on arrival, 
corpse not corp(u)s. Instead we might begin by thinking 
‘culture may never be — but, if it comes, how does it 
come?’ This alternative might, again, be thought of in 
terms of the virtuality of culture — it is still coming to 
actuality. And this takes work.7 Or else we could think of 
(ap)propriability as possession in Derrida’s spectral 
sense. Then we might speak of culture as the virtual/ 
spectral. What this would mean would be that every 
cultural thing would be open to its own exteriority — to 
that which is not its own, its property. The openness is 
(ap)propriability. 
As a sheer matter of ethics, we must attempt an outline, 
if not a definition, of culture. But such an outline remains 
— strictly — impossible while we are still using the term 
‘culture’ as a proxy for a traditional concept as such. For, 
as we have seen, it is impossible to shake that concept 
from its foundation in representational thinking. And we 
must do this for the following reason. To date, the cultural 
disciplines have done one thing only; they have tried to 
unveil what cannot be unveiled — and they have done  so  
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in the name of speaking the ‘truth’ of either culture-in-
general or else of a culture (for example, its ‘insiders’’ 
experiences) — when the truth of either is to remain 
veiled or, more precisely, to flicker between veiling and 
unveiling. Cultural ‘science’ insists on disclosure; while 
cultures as such must retain their secrets (their future 
conditionals not even experienced yet by ‘insiders’) in 
order to perdure, to have life. So the patient has to be an-
aesthetised before the cultural disciplines can operate. In 
place of the always unspecifiable grounds of cultures, the 
cultural disciplines invent proxies — ‘conventions’, ‘cus-
toms’, ‘rituals’ and so on. This is domestication, grand 
appropriation, colonisation: even if the surface politics of 
the analysis (as in ‘postcolonial’ theory) appears other-
wise. The ethical demand for an alternative is the demand 
for an end to this colonisation. If the worst confession of 
the professional anthropologist is ‘I do not understand 
them’ or ‘I cannot analyse them’, then it is also the point 
of departure for cross-cultural thinking in a more radical 
sense.8 
So to get to (what we must still call) culture, we must let 
it go as a concept in the representationalist sense. It is to 
be deconceptualised. And the first step (again following 
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism) is to insist that the 
event come utterly before the concept(ion). This is only 
the beginning. But it does point us in the direction of an 
experience of Ereignis — which could be called an ‘even-
talism’ always-open-in-and-to-becoming. And this would 
be different from any straightforward empiricism. Straight-
forward empiricism affirms usage as use — a single kind 
of use; such as the transformation of nature into commo-
dities. By contrast, eventalism affirms usage as non-pre-
decidable usability in the event (should it happen to come 
about); for what is proper or improper to a culture is not 
decidable in advance of that event. Rather this 
(ap)propriability suggests or hints at a gap — which is 
ethical in the sense that it has to do with decision. The 
gap between propriability and appropriability is, as such, 
the ordeal of the decision. 
A final and very hypothetical thought, then, which is also 
just a beginning, just the first glimmering of a thinking of 
culture outside representation. Would it be possible to 
think this: that it would be wrong to think that, by moving 
away from the nature/culture distinction — or away from 
any distinction between culture and its ‘outside’, as we 
have (to some extent) in this investigation — must we 
logically, reach an impasse in the form of a concept 
without an outside? Perhaps not. For if culture is, in its 
being, not a concept at all, the impasse may never come 
about. In that case culture would bear a very different 
(non-binary, non-oppositional) relation to what we think of 
as ‘nature’. So might it be possible, instead, to say that 
the term ‘culture’ could itself be a gloss for coming-to-
presence in and through undecidability (Deleuze’s 
transversal axis of contingent history, Derrida’s ordeal of 
the decision, Heidegger’s flickering Ereignis)? If this were 
possible then — again finally but also as another way of 
starting — culture would be this: the contingent and 
accidental lines of usage whereby whatever is brought 
into (and so comes to) order for  a  while  by  tending  and  
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caring — with this always poised on the necessary 
contingency, the possibility of the accident, that it may not 
come. If so, even nature could be said to culture itself. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. My thanks to Horst Ruthrof, Murdoch University, for 
encouraging this version of the paper via his helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
2. In particular, I am trying to address here the 
representationalism of the ‘cultural sciences’ (sociology, 
anthropology, cultural studies and the rest). Accordingly, I 
am referring to representationalism particularly in its 
realist, simple empiricist, positivist and naturalistic 
manifestations. Whether the position I advance on the 
basis of Ereignis (Heidegger), the spectral (Derrida) and 
transcendental empiricism (Deleuze) is representa-
tionalist in another sense is another and more difficult, 
question that will have to be dealt with elsewhere. Crucial 
to this question is whether the ‘flickering’ of Ereignis 
between propriety and impropriety might mean that 
culture still remains secondary to some more primary 
domain. I suspect not and assume that Ereignis as such 
is the bottom line: but the proof still remains to be worked 
through. 
3. Since it’s fairly customary to associate culture with 
belonging, one way of referring to the double of 
(ap)propriability would be to imagine English having a 
word that was the opposite of ‘belonging’ (such as 
‘unbelonging’ or ‘disbelonging’). Then we could recon-
figure culture as (ap)propriability by imagining a constant 
movement — an unsettling, flickering, hovering, haunting 
— between belonging and disbelonging. Ereignis, then, is 
all of these shades of events and ownings and their 
opposites, as well as the unstable movements between 
them. 
4. In light of the questionability or uncertainty 
(Fraglichkeit) of this coming-about, we might also speak 
of ‘Frage-ventality’. 
5. This, incidentally, is why culture cannot easily be 
legislated or made subject to policy — since legislation 
(like ethnography) begins with accomplished facts, the 
ontically-empirically completed. This is why it works in the 
perfect tense to try to calculate and secure the future. We 
are clearly reminded here of the essential fallibility of 
governance (Malpas and Wickham, 1995). 
6. Mindful no doubt of the distinction between determining 
and reflective judgment in the third Critique, Lyotard 
(1987: 35) writes (after Kant) of two ‘movements within 
the realm of critical agitation’. The first uses given 
universal rules to understand particular cases; the second 
works in the opposite direction, taking cases as given and 
deriving rules from them. The ‘empirical’ cultural 
disciplines such as ethnography, then, appear to operate 
with the second kind of methodology (a variation on 
induction) but in fact, through their insistence on the 
universality of culture as presence, operate primarily 
according to the first kind (a variety of deduction). By 
contrast, the project of a new empiricism would be that of 
reconstructing induction purely,  as  an  experiencing  her- 
 
 
 
 
hermeneutics oriented towards the openness of culture, 
cultures and cultural objects. 
7. As an indicator of the kind of work involved here, we 
must note the complexities of the idea of the virtual. In 
Difference and Repetition, for example, Deleuze (1994: 
211) separates the possible (which becomes ‘real’) from 
the virtual (which becomes ‘actual’). No doubt, this serves 
to undercut the simplistic equation of the virtual with the 
possible. But, at the same time, it elides the sheer 
possibility of the virtual. Elsewhere (1997a), I have 
examined cyber-technologies in terms of their virtuality 
through the following equation: 
 
V = ƒ (as/as-if). 
 
Here the function (ƒ) refers to the Ereignis-like ‘flickering’ 
or un-settling of the virtual between Heidegger’s ‘as-
structure’ of actual understanding and a putative ‘as-if-
structure’ on the side of the possible and the imaginary. In 
this way, my sense of the virtual is that it contains 
possibility (among other things) without being reducible to 
it. In another context, Phil Roe (1998) has shown how the 
Deleuzian version of the virtual is on all fours with 
spectrality and the ‘to come’ in Derrida. 
8. Cf. Georges Perec's (1988: 105-112) tale of the 
misunderstood anthropologist — a man with just this 
problem. In his case, the realisation of the cause of his 
problem turns out to be too much for him to bear. To 
invoke another instance, one of my students, during a 
long stay in Japan, was told by a Japanese friend: The 
anthropologists keep coming here to try to understand us.  
This makes no sense. We don’t understand ourselves! 
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